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THE OBLIGATION TO BELIEVE
Do we ever have an obligation to choose to hold beliefs, religious or
otherwise? The relations between belief, volition and moral responsibility are
the subject of William James' widely discussed essay 'The Will to Believe'.1
James first takes up the relationship between volition and belief: Does it make
sense to speak of choosing to believe a proposition? His answer is that it does,
in the sense that we can choose to act in ways which encourage the production
of a believing attitude in ourself. For example, we can be selective in
attending to evidence, and we can incline ourselves toward belief by acting
as though we already believe. By avoiding certain influences and subjecting
ourself to others, we can encourage the development of belief. In so doing,
we in effect treat ourself as a third person, and our behaviour is analogous
to what we might engage in when encouraging others toward favourable
evidence. The question of moral responsibility then becomes appropriate in
our own case in a way analogous to that in which it does with respect to our
belief-producing actions toward others. Just as the deception of others raises
moral questions, so does the deception of ourselves.2
James' main purpose is to argue for the permissibility of holding certain
beliefs despite inadequate evidence. His essay is a response to an attitude
which he takes to be widely held among philosophers, that our belief ought
always to be proportioned to the evidence. His remarks are specifically
1
 William James, 'The Will to Believe', Essays in Pragmatism, ed. Alburey Castell (New York: Hafner
Press, 1948). The doctrine appears frequently in James' other works. See, for example, 'The Sentiment
of Rationality', 'The Dilemma of Determinism', 'The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life', and the
' Conclusions' and ' Postscript' from Varieties of Religious Experience, all anthologized in Essays in Pragmatism;
also see A Pluralistic Universe (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1967), pp. 328-31; The Principles of Psychology,
2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1950), vol. 1, pp. 311-22; Some Problems of Philosophy (New York: Longman's
Green, 1948), Appendix. For recent helpful discussions ofjames' doctrine, see Patrick K. Dooley, 'The
Nature of Belief: the Proper Context for James' "The Will to Believe",' Transactions of the C. S. Peirce
Society 8, no. 3 (Summer 1972), 141-51; Arnold E. Johanson, ' "The Will to Believe" and the Ethics of
Belief, Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society u , no. 2 (Spring 1975), 110-27; Peter Kauber and Peter H.
Hare, 'The Right and Duty to Will to Believe', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 2 (December 1974),
327-43; and William Macleod, 'James' "Will to Believe" Revisited', Personalist 48, no. 2 (April 1967),
149-66. Kauber and Hare consider the question of obligation and offer a general line of argument which
involves considerations of the same sort as appealed to in arguments (3) and (4) in part in of this paper.
* The notion of self-deception raises certain conceptual problems which are relevant to this discussion
but will not be taken up in this essay. There is a significant body of literature dealing with these difficulties;
see, for example, Charles B. Daniels, 'Self-Deception and Interpersonal Deception', Personalist 55, no.
3 (Summer 1974), 244-52; Herbert Fingarette, Self-Deception (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Bela
Szabados, ' Self-Deception', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 1 (September 1974), 44-9.
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2 ALAN BRINTON
addressed to a doctrine formulated by W. K. Clifford in these terms: '.. .it
is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient
evidence'.1 James argues (in what he refers to as a 'justification of faith') that
there are some cases in which over-belief belief beyond the evidence, is justified.
'The essential thing to notice', says James in a related essay, 'is that our
active preference is a legitimate part of the game'.2 The central case, in the
discussion in 'The Will to Believe', is the religious one. The question of the
existence of God, he claims, is one on which the evidence does not clearly
favour either the affirmative or the negative. However, we are justified in
gambling on the religious hypothesis in response to our emotional needs and
desires. James' support for this position involves at least the following
distinguishable lines of argument: (i) 'passional' (volitional and emotional)
factors unavoidably influence our believing already, and what is unavoidable
cannot reasonably be forbidden; (2) the very nature of some sorts of beliefs
(for example, those which affirm value judgments) is such that they are
undecidable on purely evidentiary grounds, and it is unreasonable to
prohibit such beliefs altogether; (3) in some cases belief makes itself true (for
instance, an athelete's belief that he will win may be a condition for his doing
so); (4) in some cases belief may be a prerequisite for getting access to further
evidence (the believer may be the only person in a position to receive the
decisive evidence); (5) the prohibition expressed by Clifford is itself an
example of over-belief; and finally (6) since our eternal well-being may hinge
upon our believing beyond the evidence, we can hardly be condemned for
venturing forth. James calls this venturing beyond the evidence 'faith'.
Although James aims to defend the religious position, an important strain
of Christian religious thought actually subscribes to a position not altogether
unlike Clifford's. It is the doctrine that we are blameworthy if we fail to hold
certain beliefs. This claim, that we have a moral obligation to hold certain
beliefs, is what I wish to examine in the remainder of this essay, not in order
to support or refute it, but in order to see how it should be understood and
how it is related to James' position.
It may be illuminating first to look at a discussion of these same issues in
St Augustine's Enchiridion:
Nor do I now undertake to solve a very knotty question, which perplexed those very
acute thinkers, the Academic philosophers: whether a wise man ought to give his
assent to anything, seeing that he may fall into error by assenting to falsehood: for
all things, as they assert, are unknown or uncertain... Now, in their eyes every error
is regarded as a sin, and they think that error can be avoided by entirely suspending
belief... But with us, ' the just shall live by faith'. Now, if assent be taken away, faith
1
 W. K. Clifford, Lectures and Essays (London: Macmillan, 1879), vol. 2, p. 186.
2
 'The Sentiment of Rationality', p. 35.
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THE OBLIGATION TO BELIEVE 3
goes too; for without assent there can be no belief. And there are truths, whether
we know them or not, which must be believed if we would attain to a happy life,
that is, eternal life.1
In the first place, the last sentence of this passage suggests that Augustine
perhaps subscribes to the doctrine that there is an obligation to believe. This
is even more strongly suggested by a statement which he makes later, in
chapter 88:
Now the man who, not believing that sins are remitted in the Church, despises this
great gift of God's mercy, and persists to the last day of his life in his obstinacy of
heart, is guilty of the unpardonable sin against the Holy Spirit, in whom Christ
forgives sins.
A second point to notice is that Augustine means 'faith' in the propositional
sense: ' . . . i f assent be taken away, faith goes too'. James' use of the word
'faith' has troubled some religious believers. John Hick quotes Santayana
as complaining that James' conception lacks the 'sense of security' and 'joy'
which are characteristic of religious faith.2 However, it is clear that James
means 'faith' in pretty much the same sense that Augustine does, and that
this sense is religiously important as well as being the one recognized by
Augustine as most relevant to the question at hand. Finally, Augustine, like
James, is concerned with the relationship between belief, volition and
responsibility and wants to argue against the view that we ought not to
exercise over-belief. Only he seems to go further by suggesting that we not only
may but should exercise faith.
Now, there are two alternative forms which the doctrine of an obligation
to believe might take. One of these looks closer to Clifford's position, the other
to James'. On the one hand, unbelief might be regarded as involving a failure
to believe despite adequate evidence. On the other hand, it might be viewed as
involving a failure to venture beyond the evidence, a failure to exercise the will to
believe when one ought to do so. In the following sections these two
alternatives will be examined separately.
II
Unbelief as a failure to believe despite adequate evidence. A rather bald statement
about the relationship between belief and obligation is made by St. Paul in
his Epistle to the Romans:
For we see divine retribution revealed from heaven and falling upon all the godless
wickedness of man. In their wickedness they are stifling the truth. For all that may
be known of God by men lies plain before their eyes; indeed God himself has disclosed
1
 Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love, trans. J. F. Shaw, ed. Henry Paolucci (Chicago: Henry
Regnery, 1961), chap. 20; see also chaps. 9-19 and 21-3.
1
 John Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed., rev. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ . : Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 55-6.
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it to them. His invisible attributes, that is to say his everlasting power and deity,
have been visible, ever since the world began, to the eye of reason, in the things he
has made.1
Paul's view is echoed by John Calvin in his Institutes of the Christian Religion.2
Calvin says that knowledge of God is implanted by nature in the human
mind, 'to prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretence of ignorance'
(p. 43). Furthermore, the existence and nature of God are clearly revealed
in the creation:' But upon his individual works he has engraved unmistakable
marks of his glory, so clear and so prominent that even unlettered and stupid
folk cannot plead the excuse of ignorance' (p. 52). Unbelief, according to
Calvin, is a result of a deliberate and perverse refusal to accept overwhelming
evidence: 'This knowledge is either smothered or corrupted, partly by
ignorance, partly by malice' (p. 47). 'David's statement that ungodly men
and fools feel in their hearts that there is no God must first.. .be limited to
those who, by extinguishing the light of nature, deliberately befuddle
themselves' (p. 48).
Calvin's view is more radical and harsher, no doubt, than many traditional
Christian thinkers would accept. But a commonly held view in the Christian
tradition has been that the evidence for belief at least outweighs the evidence
against it, that this balance justifies belief, and that we have a moral
obligation to accept this evidence and believe. A refusal to believe, at least
by those acquainted with the relevant evidence, is a refusal to take the
position favoured by the evidence. If blameworthiness for unbelief comes into
the picture, for this view, it is blameworthiness for this refusal.
Two questions arise in connection with this version of the doctrine of an
obligation to believe and its application to religious belief: (1) Is the evidence
for religious belief favourable? (2) If it is favourable, does that give rise to
an obligation to believe on the part of those to whom the evidence is
available? The concern in this paper is not with the first of these questions;
the point is just that for some religious thinkers, the view that there is an
obligation to hold religious beliefs is grounded in the view that the evidence
is favourable.
We might ask parenthetically whether the word 'faith' is appropriate in
this context. Is the obligation here (if there is one) an obligation to exercise
faith? (The question is, of course, about propositional faith.) This question
draws attention to the fact that for this version of the obligation to believe
'faith' does not mean 'venturing beyond the evidence'. Propositional faith,
on this view, turns out to be more or less equivalent to rationally justified belief
(perhaps restricted to a certain class of religious beliefs). The propositions
of faith either have their acceptance directly justified by favourable evidence
1
 Rom. 1: 18-20, New English Bible.
1
 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, ed. John T. McNeill, 2 vols.
(Philadelphia: Westminster, i960), vol. 1, bk. 1, chaps. 3-5.
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or are justified rationally by a legitimate appeal to authority. Aquinas, for
example, holds that there are rational grounds for acceptance of the Biblical
writings as a divine revelation. Calvin holds the same view.1 Faith in the
particular propositions of the Bible, then, is belief justified by its status as a
revelation.
How does this version of the doctrine of an obligation to believe relate to
the disagreement between James and Clifford? Well, in the first place the
doctrine seems to fall clearly under the principle that we ought to proportion
our belief to the evidence. Clifford's formulation is weaker than this, however.
Also, James is in partial agreement with Clifford. Consider the following
possible imperatives concerning belief:
1i) Proportion belief to the evidence.
(2) Do not believe in the face of a preponderance of unfavourable evidence.
(3) Do not disbelieve in the face of a preponderance of favourable evidence.
(4) Do not suspend belief in the face of a preponderance of favourable
evidence.
(5) Do not believe beyond the evidence.
Notice first certain relationships between these principles. First, (i) is the
strongest and seems clearly to entail all the others. Second, since disbelief is
a kind of belief, (3) is just a special case of (2), so that any commitment to
(2) will entail a commitment to (3). Third, the difference between (3) and
(4) is the difference between disbelief and nonbelief a difference which
underlines an ambiguity in the religious notion of unbelief.
The clear disagreement between James and Clifford is on (5), which
Clifford asserts and James denies. As a result of his denial of (5), James must
also deny (1). On the other hand, James accepts (2) and therefore must also
accept (3). Clifford must accept (2) and (3) as well, since (2) follows from
(5) which he accepts. As a result, Clifford and James must agree that we ought
not to disbelieve in the religious hypothesis if it is favoured by the evidence.
At this point the distinction between disbelief and nonbelief becomes
crucial, and the ambiguity in 'unbelief comes to the fore. If we accept the
view that we ought always to proportion our belief to evidence (1), then we
must view suspension of belief (in the face of a preponderance of favourable
evidence) as wrong, though perhaps as a lesser offence than rfwbelief. So,
given a balance of favourable evidence, unbelief in either sense will be wrong.
If (1) were an accurate formulation of his view, Clifford would be
committed to the Calvinist version of the obligation to believe (although he
would disagree with Calvin's view about the state of the evidence on religious
matters). The relevant application of (1) could be formulated in terms of a
principle analogous to (5): Do not believe short of the evidence. There is,
however, no good evidence that Clifford subscribes to (1) and no good reason
1
 Institutes, chap. 8; Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, trans. Anton C. Pegis (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday, Image Books, 1955), chap. 6.
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to think that he would accept this version of the obligation to believe. He
expresses only his acceptance of an obligation to suspend belief or to refrain
from over-belief.
On the other hand, although James rejects (i), there is some reason to
suspect that on his view the distinction between disbelief and nonbelief breaks
down. If so, then the difference between (3), which he must accept, and (4)
will break down as well, with the result that he must accept the view that we
have an obligation to believe when the evidence is favourable.
There are two reasons to suspect that the distinction between disbelief and
nonbelief breaks down on James' view, at least in certain cases. The first is
that he tends generally to identify belief and action. The second is that he
explicitly says in 'The Will to Believe' that there are cases in which from
a practical (and presumably also a moral) point of view believing a
proposition false and suspending belief come down to the same thing. In those
cases the relevant dichotomy is between acceptance and rejection. In those
cases it matters not whether the rejection is viewed as a matter of disbelief
or as a matter of nonbelief.1
It would be incorrect to say that the distinction between disbelief and
nonbelief is generally undermined on James' view. The test of a distinction
for James is whether it makes any practical difference: ' There can be no
difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference elsewhere —no difference
in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in concrete fact
and in conduct subsequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow,
somewhere, and somewhen'.2 In so far as the choice between disbelief and
nonbelief makes a difference, it is a real choice. James' claim is that there
are some cases, however, in which it does not make a significant difference
so far as the important practical implications of the choice. In just those cases,
the distinction between disbelief and nonbelief is irrelevant. Those are the
cases in which there is what James calls 'a. genuine option' between acceptance
of a belief and failure to accept. A genuine option is one which is 'living',
' forced' and ' momentous'. An option is' living' if each side actually has some
appeal to us and 'momentous' if it offers a unique opportunity of some
significance. It is 'forced' if the significant choice is between accepting the
proposition and going without it. Its being 'forced' is what undermines the
distinction between disbelief and nonbelief.3
Genuine options are also the cases in which over-belief is justified, the cases
in which principle (5) does not apply. There is, however, a second condition
which must be satisfied for James if (5) is to be set aside in a particular case.
Not only must there be a genuine option, but the evidence must not clearly
favour one side or the other of the question. What is important to notice here
1
 'The Will to Believe', pp. 105-6.
8
 'What Pragmatism Means', Essays in Pragmatism, p. 144.
3
 See section 1 of 'The Will to Believe'.
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THE OBLIGATION TO BELIEVE J
is that there may be cases in which the first condition is met but the second
is not, cases in which there is a genuine option with evidence clearly favouring
one side. Suppose the genuine option is between believing or going without
p, but that the evidence clearly favours p. Then, given the acceptance of (3)
('Do not disbelieve in the face of a preponderance of favourable evidence')
and the obliteration in the case of genuine options of the distinction between
disbelief and nonbelief (at least so far as practical considerations go),
acceptance of (4) ('Do not suspend belief in the face of preponderance of
favourable evidence') must follow. Thus, although at first it may have seemed
as though it would be Clifford whose position might favour the first version
of the obligation to believe, it actually turns out to be James who must accept
it, although only in those special cases in which there is a genuine option
together with a preponderance of favourable evidence.
in
Unbelief as a failure to venture beyond the evidence. The question now to be taken
up is whether it is ever blameworthy to refrain from exercising propositional
faith, whether we ever have an obligation to engage in over-belief. I want to
take this up in the context of James' doctrine of the will to believe. Assuming
that his doctrine is correct, does it ever take us beyond the permissibility of
over-belief to its obligatoriness?
At least four possible lines of argument for such an obligation can be
developed within the context of James' discussions and applications of his
doctrine. Two of them are weak and fairly easily disposed of. The other two
are more promising and require a closer examination. The first two are as
follows: (1) We are unavoidably influenced in the formation of our beliefs
by passional factors. Some of these influences are more harmful than others.
Therefore, we have an obligation to exercise some control over these factors
by choosing to be influenced by some rather than others, insofar as this is
possible. (2) In some cases we have an obligation to consider as much
evidence as possible on a particular question. And in some of these cases it
may happen that the only way to get access to important evidence is by
over-belief. If such a case arises, we thus have an obligation to believe beyond
the evidence presently at hand.
The problem with the first of these arguments is that there is an alternative
which is at least as plausible, and that is that it may instead be our obligation
to fight against these influences, even though the battle may never be
perfectly successful. Although the ideal of rationality may never be fully
satisfied, as is generally the case with ideals, we ought to earnestly pursue
it. We can never succeed at being perfectly kind, for example, but this fact
does not justify selective cruelty.
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8 ALAN BRINTON
Suppose, in connection with (2), that we assume that there are cases
in which there is an obligation to consider all available evidence (within the
constraints imposed by competing obligations and the practicalities of the
situation). The important (and plausible) further assumption of the argument
is that rational considerations may appear on more than one level. On one
level, evidence is the consideration; but on another level, there may be rational
grounds other than evidence for/) which favour the acceptance ofjfr. However,
to say that factors on this second level permit over-belief is one thing: to say that
they require it is another. Whatever considerations have led to the conclusion
that in a particular case we have an obligation to consider the evidence, these
considerations will not automatically take us to the further conclusion. We
may be getting access to further evidence by over-belief but we are also failing
to operate according to the evidence which we already have. One obligation
concerning evidence weighs against another. It may be that the obligation
to go after further evidence obtainable only through over-belief outweighs the
obligation to operate according to the evidence we have. But, if so, it is by
virtue of factors other than simply a concern for evidence. It will then be
these other factors which justify over-belief
This brings us to the second pair of arguments: (3) There may be cases
in which over-belief is a precondition for meeting some specific moral
responsibility. In such cases an obligation to exercise over-belief will be
entailed. Therefore, there may be cases in which we have a moral obligation
to believe beyond the evidence. (4) In addition to our specific moral
responsibilities, we have a more general obligation to be committed to
morality. This higher level moral obligation requires acceptance, on faith,
of certain general principles which cannot be established on the basis of
evidence. Therefore, over-belief with respect to these principles is obligatory.
In connection with (3), consider one of James' examples: a man climbing
in the Alps manages to get himself into a position where he can be saved only
by making a treacherous leap. Never having been in similar circumstances
before, he lacks clear evidence about whether he can make such a leap or
not. However, if he manages to work up the belief that he can make it, his
confidence will increase his chances of success.' In this case', James says,' the
part of wisdom clearly is to believe what one desires; for the belief is one of
the indispensable preliminary conditions of the realization of its object.'1
We might say of the man in this example that ' he owes it to himself to
exercise faith. Whether obligations to oneself are moral obligations is a matter
of dispute. But suppose that making the leap is the only way of keeping a
promise or fulfilling some other clearly moral obligation. Consider a further
example: a soldier in battle realizes that he may be able to save his comrades
by some daring act, such as singlehandedly charging and overtaking an
enemy position. It is not clear whether he can succeed. But success depends
1
 'The Sentiment of Rationality', p. 27.
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THE OBLIGATION TO BELIEVE 9
upon confidence and confidence upon a belief that he will succeed. In this
case it seems clear that over-belief Wi\\ be meritorious although not obligatory.
I suggest that it is plausible to say the same of the previous sort of case, that
to will to believe in such a case is meritorious, it is to go beyond the call of
duty. If willing to believe were a simple act of acceptance, it might make
good sense in the previous case to say there is an obligation. But to show that
there is an obligation, we must establish clearly that the necessity for over-belief
and its complexity does not relieve one from the obligation to keep a promise
or fulfill some other moral obligation. The argument, as it stands at least,
does not do this. Two observations, finally, can be made about this
argument: (a) it makes some progress by at least showing that over-belief can
be meritorious, if not obligatory, and (b) it does not seem to help much with
the grander issues, such as belief in the existence of God.
The fourth line of argument more obviously applies to the grander
questions. Perhaps the argument should be formulated in somewhat different
terms. We might put it this way: a person who fails to be generally committed
to morality may be said to be morally deficient, although in a different sense
(but also a more serious one) than a person who breaks particular moral rules
or fails to fulfill specific moral obligations. Maybe words such as 'obligation'
and ' blameworthiness' ought to be reserved for specific cases within the
context of morality. But still it is an offence, a much grander one, to fail to
take 'the moral point of view'.
This sort of formulation is more consistent with James' actual formulations
and applications of the doctrine of the will to believe. The applications which
concern him primarily are to larger philosophical questions, such as the
problem of free-will and the problem of objective values.1 In so far as a
general commitment to morality presupposes a belief in freedom and a belief
in objective value, it can be argued that one is morally deficient if one fails
to exercise the will to believe on these issues (assuming that one is capable
of doing so). If it could be shown that the belief in objective values
presupposes a belief in the existence of God, then the same could be argued
in connection with that belief. All this depends, of course, on the making of
certain connections. In 'The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life',
however, a more direct variant is suggested. In that essay, James claims that
values arise out of our belief in value. The belief in values is 'self-verifying',
it 'makes itself true'. Thus, it is up to us to make the universe a moral one
by choosing to believe that it is. In the context of this view, a general
commitment to morality is a matter of the creation of morality by the exercise
of faith. Again, there is the suggestion that things will be somehow better if
we do this and that in some sweeping sense we 'ought' to do it.
1
 On the value issue see 'The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life', 'The Sentiment of Rationality',
pp. 31-6 and 'The Will to Believe', pp. 103-4. O° t n e question of free will see 'The Dilemma of
Determinism'.
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These, then, are our general results, at least within the context of James' view,
with respect to the doctrine that we may have an obligation to believe: (i)
in the case of what James calls a 'genuine option' a preponderance of
favourable evidence obligates us to believe; (2) in some cases it may be at
least meritorious to exercise over-belief about particular matters of fact, when
some moral good may be accomplished through doing so; (3) if there are
certain general principles whose acceptance is presupposed by a general
commitment to morality and whose acceptance can only be brought about
by over-belief it may be that one who fails to make the appropriate efforts
can be said to be morally deficient in a rather serious sense. One might even
go so far, on this last point, as to argue that belief in the existence of God
is obligatory, at least for those for whom it is a 'living option'.
There is one final issue which must be taken up briefly. To what extent
are the sorts of obligations or responsibilities we have been talking about
moral, as opposed to prudential or something else? There is no doubt that
Clifford regards the entire issue as a moral one. But James'justification of
faith seems to place more emphasis on rational and prudential considerations
than on moral ones. Despite this, with arguments (3) and (4) the considerations
appealed to are obviously moral, and it would be unreasonable to regard
any obligations given rise to as non-moral. Even the considerations involved
in (1) and (2) might be argued to be morally significant, although the
demands appealed to seem to be rational rather than moral demands. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to consider in any detail the possible
connections between the demands of rationality and those of morality. But
in conclusion I will suggest what seems to me to be a promising way of
connecting the two. Moral responsibility presupposes the possibility of moral
deliberation, evaluation and justification are essentially rational notions. A
commitment to them presupposes a commitment to rationality. So a general
commitment to morality presupposes a general commitment to rationality.
Thus, ultimately the demands of rationality may be in part moral ones, just
as the demands of morality are in part rational ones.
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